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THERE is an essential connection between law, language and morals. It be- 
comes evident when one notes what law and morals have in common and con- 
siders the language of specific moral and legal theories. 
Both law and morals are normative subjects. They deal with value terms 
as well as with language that refer to some nonnormatively described "is." In 
law, the "is" appears as "the facts of the case," whereas the normative factor 
exhibits itself in such words as "innocent," "guilty," "delict," "right," "lia- 
bility," "obligation" and "murder." In personal morality, religion, art and lit- 
erature "realism" purports merely to exhibit or describe what is, but with a 
tension of conscience that combines the "ought" and the "is," adding evalua- 
tive terms such as "good," "bad," "sin," "virtue," "ought," "beautiful," "ugly," 
"selfish," "self-sacrificingly God-committed" or "aesthetically sensitive or in- 
sensitive." 
But there is more than similarity between law, morals and the humanities 
generally. Implicit in any legal system, or theory defining the interpretation 
of the words in its positive cases and rules, are personal moral and also epis- 
temological assumptions. Conversely, there is no epistemological philosophy of 
the source of the meaning of language, or personal moral theory, that does not 
entail specific legal consequences with respect to a judge's decision in at least 
some concrete cases. Note, for example, the relation between the late Judge 
Learned Hand's positivistic moral and linguistic philosophy and his legal in- 
terpretation of the American Bill of Rights. Modern alternatives to Anglo- 
American legal positivism provide additional illustrations. The world's legal 
systems, antecedent to the creation of Western legal science, which Sir Henry 
Maine referred to as "Status," provide a further example. 
JUDGE LEARNED HAND'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
After indicating that Justice Holmes' "understanding of the meaning of law 
[was] strictly Austinian," i.e., positivistic, Judge Hand added that for Holmes 
"morals . . . depend upon preferences, arbitrary and imperative."' This a- 
mounts to the assertion that the positivistic Austinian theory of law, which 
Judge Hand accepts, rests on an assumption about personal morality. Hence 
his legal theory is also a moral theory. Stated with analytic precision, its moral 
premise (lM) is: 
tSterling Professor of Philosophy and Law, Yale University Law School. 
1. HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 58 (2d ed. 1953). 
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(iM) For any person p and for any object of personal moral judgment 
x, to say that x is good as judged by p is equivalent to saying 
that x is preferred by p. 
In the case of the English jurist Austin, from whom Justice Holmes and 
Judge Learned Hand derived their legal positivism, this premise took on a 
formally equivalent, but hedonistic content. This occurs in Austin's The Prov- 
ince of Jurisprudence Determined where he writes that of all previous think- 
ers, the one whose legal philosophy is nearest to his own is John Locke of 
the Essay Concerning Human Understanding when the latter identifies the 
meanings of the words "good or evil" with "pleasure or pain."2 
This connection between (1) the personal moral premise of Austin, Holmes 
and Judge Hand's positivistic theory of law and (2) Locke's Essay is impor- 
tant because the latter classic is primarily an epistemological treatise. This 
means that Austin, Holmes and Judge Hand's positivistic conception of law 
is a linguistic as well as a moral philosophy, since epistemology is the science 
that investigates the nature and source of the meaning of words. Locke's epis- 
temological thesis is that all meaningful words in any subject whatever are 
radically empirical in character. In short, any meaningful word refers directly 
or indirectly to sense data as the source of its entire meaning. Expressed with 
analytic clarity, this epistemological assumption (lEp) "s, where the superscript 
RE stands for the radical empirical theory of the meaning of all words, is: 
(lEp)RE For any person p and for any concept c in any subject what- 
ever, to say that c is a meaningful word is equivalent to affirm- 
ing that c refers for its entire meaning to a datum given direct- 
ly through the senses or is definable in terms of such data. 
Another name for this epistemological theory of language is "positivism." 
It is precisely because the legal theory of Judge Hand, Thayer, Austin and the 
John Locke of the Essay rests on this epistemological premise that it is called 
"legal positivism." 
From this positivistic assumption (lEp)RE concerning the source of the 
meaning of all language, it follows that if the normative words of personal 
morality or positive law are to be meaningful, their meanings must be identi- 
fied with radically empirical data such as privately sensed pleasure and pain 
after the manner of Austin, Bentham and Locke's Essay, or personal approv- 
als or disapprovals after the manner of Hume, or private "preferences, arbi- 
tray and imperative" as in the case of Holmes as described and accepted by 
Judge Hand. In fact, unless this premise of Locke's Essay is assumed, both 
the theory of personal morality of Hume, Bentham, Austin, Holmes and Hand 
and their conception of law fail to be required and lose their initial plausibility. 
Conversely, the two foregoing humanistic assumptions, (lEp)RE and (IM), 
concerning (a) the source of the entire meaning of all words and (b) the 
meaning of the words of personal morality in particular, entail a specific 
theory of the way in which legal language is to be interpreted by the judge in 
2. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 166 (1954). 
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any legal system. This becomes evident when the legal premise of Judge 
Hand's positivistic theory of law is specified. 
It is to be emphasized that Judge Hand's moral premise (IM) defines only 
the good or just in relation to a particular person. In any official legal judg- 
ment, however, the judge speaks not for his own private pleasure, approval 
or preference, but for those of the community as expressed through official 
procedures of the legal system as a whole. Hence, it is a consequence of the 
positivistic theory of the meaning of moral words that the legally just and the 
personally good or just are two quite different things. As Judge Hand has 
emphasized in his article on his colleague Judge Thomas Swan, a positivistic 
judge must keep from his legal judgment his personal moral judgment of what 
is just.3 The question arises, therefore, concerning what legally just, as distinct 
from personally good or just, means for any radically empirical legal positiv- 
ist. The answer to this question lies in their legal postulate. 
One of the first linguistic and moral positivists to see this problem and to 
suggest the direction which its answer must take was Hume. This occurred 
in his Treatise where, after positivistically identifying the meaning of "per- 
sonally good as judged by p" with "approved by p," he points out that, where- 
as personally good is a "natural" concept, justice (in the sense of publicly or 
officially just) is "artificial."4 By this, I take it, Hume meant two things: 
First, the meaning of the expression "personally good or just" is natural be- 
cause it refers to something given empirically. Second, since justice refers to 
the "objectively good" and "the officially just" in the sense of being the same 
and prescriptive for everyone in the legal system, and since radical empirical 
natural knowledge gives only a good or just relative to the particular per- 
cipient, it follows that legal justice is not a natural datum of human experi- 
ence and must depend on some artificially introduced convention. Hence, the 
doctrine of natural law is valid for morals but meaningless in legal science. 
As Hume and Bentham noted, the least artificial convention for any legal 
system seems to be the following: 
(IL)"E For any person p and for any object of official legal judgment 
x, to say that x is objectively good or legally just is equivalent 
to saying that x is approved or preferred by or pleasing to the 
majority of p. 
It is to be noted that this, the legal postulate of legal positivism, expresses 
both its epistemology and its personal morality, thereby exhibiting its theory 
of the relation between language, morals and law. The connection between law 
and language is revealed in the assumption that "legally just" must be defined 
in terms of empirically known data; otherwise, this theory of law would not 
be positivistic. The essential connection between the positivists' law and their 
morals is revealed in the legal postulate (IL)BE, which defines the legally just 
3. Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167 (1947); HAND, op. cit. supra note 
1, at 209-19. 
4. 2 HuME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 257-58 (1886). 
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in terms of private preferences, approvals or pleasures together with the quan- 
titative notion of the majority of people. 
Several implications of this theory of law have not received the attention 
they deserve. First, legal justice, as distinct from private morals, is made a 
mere question of numbers. From this it follows that should there be nothing 
concerning some particular legal dispute between two people about which the 
majority of people in the legal system agree in their approval or disapproval, 
the concept of what is legally just with respect to this dispute is meaningless. 
Second, the Anglo-American judge's use of past precedents to arrive at a legal 
decision of which the majority of people today disapprove should not exist. 
Third, the traditional American legal practice of declaring majority-approved 
legislative statutes illegal if their substantive content is incompatible with the 
right of a single dissenter to a religious or political belief that affronts the 
legislative and popular majority also becomes meaningless. Certainly, if to say 
that "x is legally just" is equivalent to saying that "x is approved by the 
majority," then, as the legal positivists Hobbes and Austin saw, to talk about 
a majority-approved statute being illegal is to affirm a contradiction. It is a 
tribute to the integrity of Judge Hand, if not to the adequacy of his positivis- 
tic linguistic, moral and legal philosophy, that he accepted this consequence of 
positivism in law, language and morals. In his article on "Chief Justice Stone's 
Concept of the Judicial Function," Judge Hand tells us that the Bill of Rights 
is to be interpreted not as law, but merely as morals or "admonitions to for- 
bearance"5 to the legislators and the electorate which, if they do not follow, "a 
judge of integrity" (a judge holding Judge Hand's positivistic legal philoso- 
phy) can do nothing to redress. 
A fourth consequence is that even if the majority agree on what they ap- 
prove, prefer or find pleasing, this theory of law leaves meaningless the obliga- 
tion of everyone else in the legal system to be judged by what the majority 
approve. In short, this conception of law cannot resolve what the writer else- 
where has called the "problem of legal inductions the problem of passing 
from approved by the majority to obligatory for everyone in the legal system. 
Just as Judge Hand has noted, quite correctly, that "x is morally good," i.e., 
"preferred by me" is quite a different thing from "x is legally just," i.e., "pre- 
ferred by the majority of people in the legal system," so the latter is different 
from and cannot give meaning to "x is legally obligatory for everyone in the 
legal system." Austin's attempt, in his classic definition of law, to meet this 
difficulty, by appeal to the materialistic club of Hobbes' political sovereign, will 
not do for three reasons: First, Hobbes' physical club is that of a natural law 
materialistically metaphysical theory, and, as shown above, for any moral and 
legal radically empirical positivist, a naturalistic, i.e., an empirical, theory of 
the meaning of normative words exists in morals and is meaningless for law, 
as any metaphysics, be it materialistic or spiritual, is similarly meaningless. 
5. HAND, op. cit. supra note 1, at 204. 
6. NORTHROP, THE COMPLEXITY OF LEGAL AND ETHICAL EXPERIENCE ch. 22 (1959). 
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Second, the club of the political sovereign, which is capable of bringing pain or 
evil to bear on anyone who disapproves of what the majority approve, must be, 
as it was for Hobbes, a naturalistic public object in the space and time of 
physical science, which is bigger than the similar clubs of anyone else in the 
community. But such a public object, to be meaningful, requires a realistic 
theory of the meaning of words, as again Hobbes well knew, and the realistic 
theory is not warranted by the epistemological premise (lEp)R11 above of 
Locke's Essay and the moral or legal positivist's linguistic theory. Third, as 
the radical empirical and positivistic Hume himself made clear, no "is," how- 
ever big and painful it may be when applied, can give an "ought."7 
Kant also saw this fatal weakness in British empirical legal positivism. 
The neo-Kantian lawyer Professor Hans Kelsen has emphasized it more re- 
cently.8 That Hume, Kant, Kelsen and the writer are correct on this point is 
confirmed by the fact that contemporary British lawyers, such as Professor H. 
L. A. Hart,9 brought up in British radical empirical philosophy and Austinian 
legal positivism now see that Austin and Hobbes were in error in their theory 
of legal obligation. 
Notwithstanding its initial promise as a support for liberal democracy and 
its influence upon English law since Bentham and upon American law since 
Thayer, it appears that the days of the decisive influence 'of Judge Hand's 
theory of the relation between law, morals and language are numbered. Al- 
ready in its spiritual home, England, Austin and Hobbes' legal positivism is 
a seriously maimed if not a dead dodo, since its legal assumption, (IL)RE 
above, has been replaced, by the quite different positivistic theory of law of 
Kelsen. This shows in the writings of such English lawyers as Professors Gran- 
ville Williams, Graham Hughes and H. L. A. Hart. 
It does not follow, however, that an adequate theory of the relation between 
law, morals and language is to be found in the writings of these men. A read- 
ing of their works will show that they are still heavily under the influence of 
British radically empirical moral and linguistic theory and especially that re- 
cent version of it represented by I. A. Richards and the later Wittgenstein. 
In other words, they are still Austinian positivists so far as their theory of 
language and much of their theory of morals are concerned and have merely 
replaced the Austinian legal premise (IL)BE above with that of Kelsen in 
order to make the concept of legal obligation meaningful. The result is a legal, 
moral and linguistic confusion instead of an adequate theory, as the following 
considerations show: (1) As was indicated in our determination above of the 
relation between morals, language and law in Judge Hand's legal theory, the 
Austinian positivist's legal postulate is required by (a) his radically empirical 
epistemological premise and (b) the moral postulate which it in turn entails. 
(2) Kelsen's legal positivism, because of its neo-Kantian epistemological as- 
7. HUME, op. cit. supra note 4, at 245-46. 
8. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (Wedberg trans., 1946). 
9. AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at vii-xliii. 
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sumption concerning the meaning of words in any adequate scientific lan- 
guage, be it normative or nonnormative, requires, however, for its validity 
and meaningfulness a quite different theory of language from that of Locke's 
Essay, Hume, Bentham, Austin, I. A. Richards or the later, exceedingly nom- 
inalistic and contextually operational Wittgenstein. But for a follower of Locke, 
Hume, Richards, or Wittgenstein to affirm that any word has the meaning as- 
signed to it by either a Kantian or a neo-Kantian theory of knowledge is to 
affirm "metaphysical nonsense." Hence, these British Kelsenian legal positivists 
do not explain how Kelsen's theory of legal obligation conforms with their 
Austinian and Wittgensteinian theory of the meaning of words and of morals. 
Nor can they explain without radically modifying their present theory of both 
morals and language. For what has to be realized is that in making the shift 
from Austinian to Kelsenian legal positivism it does not suffice to change 
merely the Austinian legal postulate (IL)IE above; its moral and linguistic 
assumptions (IM) and (lEp)BE must be changed also. 
What direction must this change take? It will help to find the answer if 
we summarize the three major points at which the traditional Anglo-American 
legal positivism fails. First, its Austinian and Hobbesian concept of the sanc- 
tion for positive law is false on two grounds: (a) its appeal to Hobbes' ma- 
terialistic club rests upon a naive realistic theory of the meaning of language, 
and naive realism is incompatible with positivism, and (b) as Hume, the great- 
est of linguistic positivists showed, and Kant and Kelsen reconfirmed, no "is" 
however big and absolutely painful can give an "ought," be it a moral or a 
legal obligation. Second, Austinian legal positivism leaves meaningless the 
obligation of any and everyone in any legal system, rather than merely the 
majority who approve a particular positive legal rule, to be legally judged by 
the norms of the legal system. Third, it provides no legal meaning, though it 
does provide a moral meaning, for the right of a person to his own religious, 
political or nonnormative scientific belief when that belief is disapproved or 
not preferred by or not pleasing to the majority of the people and their official- 
ly elected representatives. This follows, let it be recalled, from the legal postu- 
late (IL)"E above. If "x is legally just" is equivalent to "x is what the major- 
ity approve," then it is self-contradictory to talk about anything that the ma- 
jority approve being unjust. 
Since our concern is with morals as well as law, it is important to note that 
this unfortunate consequence of Austinian legal positivism with respect to the 
legal protection of religious and political dissenters from what the majority 
disapprove, is a consequence of the positivist's theory of morals, quite apart 
from their legal postulate (IL)RE. Such is the case because their moral premise 
(IM) locates the normative value of anything, not in the substantive content 
of the object x that is evaluated, but solely in the radically empirical, intro- 
spective psychological experience of the evaluator. As Hume wrote, 
Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance 
[t]he vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You 
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never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast.... 
It lies in yourself, not in the object.'O 
Forthwith, it becomes meaningless for the moral value of anything to turn on 
its substantive content, if, as occurs in judicial review, a majority-approved 
legislative statute is judged with respect to the legality of its substantive con- 
tent. This is why Judge Learned Hand is correct when he sees that a con- 
sistent Austinian legal positivist, what he calls a "judge of integrity," must 
interpret the language of the Bill of Rights as moral exhortation rather than 
as law. This also is what Judge Hand means when he adds, in the aforemen- 
tioned article on Mr. Justice Stone, that there is no difference in this respect 
between majority-approved statutes affecting personal rights and those involv- 
ing property rights or New Deal social legislation. If the meaning of morals 
as well as of law is not in the substantive content of what is judged but in 
"your own breast," this is true. Certainly, if "x is good" or "x is just" is equi- 
valent to "x being approved," then approval is justice and what is approved 
is irrelevant. Clearly, Hume's conception of morals has legal implications 
which Judge Hand expresses in his theory of judicial review and in his in- 
terpretation of the language of the Bill of Rights in the American legal sys- 
tem. 
SOME RECENT ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL ANGLO-AMERICAN MORAL 
AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 
It is generally accepted by the majority of contemporary analytic philoso- 
phers and British lawyers, such as those mentioned above, that the identifi- 
cation of the meaning of the normative words "good" and "bad" in personal 
morals with the radically empirical data of introspective psychology, such as 
the "pleasure" and "pain" of Locke, Bentham and Austin, Hume's "approv- 
als" or Judge Hand's "arbitrary preferences" commits what the late Professor 
G. E. Moore called "the naturalistic fallacy."" The gist of this fallacy consists 
in pointing out that such a theory entails that the propositions "pleasure is 
good," "my preference is good" or "what I approve is good" are equivalent to 
the trivial tautologies "pleasure is pleasure," "my preference is my preference" 
or "what I approve is what I approve"; whereas, clearly, when one predicates 
the word "good" of anything, one is affirming something more than such a 
trivial tautology. In short, sentences in which any normative word is predi- 
cated of any empirical fact are clearly synthetic, i.e., the predicate term means 
more than the subject term. Since the moral and legal theory of Hume, Ben- 
tham, Austin, Hobbes, Holmes and Judge Hand has the consequence of mak- 
ing such sentences analytic, their theory is false. 
Moore's own theory of personal morality throws additional light on the 
relation between law and language. Due to his realistic theory of the meaning of 
words, he asserted that there are objects of human knowledge which are the 
10. HUME, op. cit. supra note 4, at 245. 
11. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (1922). 
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same for all knowers and which, therefore, are not relative to particular 
percipients and evaluators after the manner of all items of knowledge in a 
radically empirical epistemology. This theory made it meaningful for Moore 
to interpret the meaning of the word "good" in personal morals as referring to 
a nonempirical, realistic, ethical property which is the same for all knowers 
and incapable of further analysis. The reason why it is both nonempirical and 
unanalyzable into empirical factors such as pleasure, or approval or preference 
is that, otherwise, the naturalistic fallacy occurs. 
Essential to Moore's theory is his distinction between "intrinsically good" 
and "instrumentally good." A "good "is intrinsic when its goodness depends 
on nothing other than itself. A "good" is instrumental if its goodness depends 
on its efficacy in achieving intrinsic goodness. Only intrinsic goodness is non- 
empirical and not further analyzable. Since this means that it is known im- 
mediately or intuitively, this theory has been called the "intuitive theory" of 
morals. Expressed with analytic precision, this theory (lM)I, where the super- 
script I means the intuitive theory, therefore, is: 
(lM)' For any person p and for any object or moral judgment x, to 
say that x is intrinsically good is equivalent to saying that x is 
characterized by a nonempirical, unanalyzable ethical predicate 
4' where 4' is a realistic epistemological property the same for 
all knowers. 
This entails the consequence that all normative subjects, and hence law as well 
as morals, contain at least one basic concept which is autonomous and which, 
therefore, does not define away, after the manner of Austinian legal positivism, 
sociological jurisprudence and some American legal realists, in terms of the 
empirical data of any empirical science. 
The words "realistic epistemological property" in moral assumption (lM)' 
express the fact that just as the Austinian legal positivist's theory of what the 
word "good" means requires a radical empirical theory of the meaning of 
language for its justification, so Moore's theory of morals assumes a realistic 
epistemological theory of the meaning of both descriptive and intrinsic evalua- 
tive language. The difference between these two theories of the meaning of any 
word is, therefore, important. 
Realism is the linguistic theory that words do not require the particular 
observer or evaluator to be specified, for any descriptive or evaluative state- 
ment to be meaningful. This is why in (lM)I the phrase "as judged by a 
particular p" does not appear. In descriptive common-sense judgments or 
natural science, realism means that we know objects and laws invariant or the 
same for all observers or physical frames of reference, which exist independent- 
ly of any particular perceiver being present. By way of contrast, radical em- 
piricism entails the thesis, as Galilei, Newton, Bishop Berkely and Hume 
showed, that it is meaningless to make either a descriptive or evaluative state- 
ment without specifying the particular perceiver or the evaluator for whom 
the statement is true. This is the point of Bishop Berkeley's famous state- 
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ment concerning descriptive statements that esse est percipi by a particular 
perceiver. This is why also in Judge Hand's moral postulate (lM)RE above 
it is necessary to include the phrase "as judged by a particular p." Otherwise 
there would be no such thing as the defendant's behavior being "good," i.e., 
approved, as evaluated by the defendant and "bad," i.e., disapproved, as 
evaluated by the plaintiff. 
The late Professor Felix Cohen, accepted Moore's moral theory and applied 
it to law. First he showed that all other normative words in both morals and 
law can be defined in terms of Moore's intrinsic goodness taken as a non- 
empirical, not further analyzable, primitive concept. Second, he noted that the 
tendency among some pragmatically minded American legal realists and many 
sociological jurisprudes, such as Professors Pound, McDougal and Lass- 
well, to regard law as merely an instrument of social control, thereby making 
the meaning of all normative words "normatively ambiguous" and the mean- 
ing of all legal language dependent on a "policy decision," rests on two errors: 
The first is the failure to realize that science contains constitutively introduced 
concepts as well as instrumentally defined ones. The second is the failure to 
distinguish in morals and law between the intrinsically good and just and in- 
strumental goodness and justice. This does not mean that the instrumental 
role of law is not very great or not prodigiously important. But its presence 
and importance arise from the fact that morals and law are not merely hand- 
maids to some other subject, but contain one autonomous, intrinsic goal value of 
their own. Consequently, to be a properly trained lawyer or a judge of in- 
tegrity is to be concerned with the intrinsically good and just as well as the 
instrumental. 
Moreover, if, as G. E. Moore's theory entails, moral goodness is a realistic, 
primitive ethical predicate the same for all knowers, it follows that the in- 
trinsically good as known by one person is identical with the intrinsically good 
as known by any other, however much their instrumental moral and legal 
concepts for realizing this intrinsic goodness in particular cultures, legal sys- 
tems and circumstances may vary. Forthwith Judge Hand's and the legal posi- 
tivists' necessity for distinguishing between the morally good, relative to the 
particular evaluator, and the officially and legally just evaporates. This per- 
mits one to identify the intrinsically just in law with the intrinsically good in 
morals. Then law and its justice become conceived, as they were by both 
Felix Cohen and his father, Morris Cohen, as the quest for the morally good 
life, where "good" means Moore's intrinsic moral goodness. 
The lawyer's concept of the sanction for law then undergoes a sea-change. 
Instead of it being, as in Austin's famous definition of "laws, . . . properly 
so-called,"''2 the physical power of the sovereign to bring absolute pain or evil to 
bear on those who dissent from his commands, it is the intrinsic moral goal 
value of law which sanctions the policeman's use of his physical club. Thus, the 
policeman can be tried and condemned for murder if, in the use of his over- 
12. AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 13. 
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powering physical club, he violates the substantive content of the norms pre- 
scribing its use by the positive law. Hence, Sir Arthur Goodhart, the con- 
temporary Regius Professor of Jurisprudence Emeritus of Oxford Univer- 
sity, is correct when he writes: "It is because a rule is regarded as obligatory 
that a measure of coercion may be attached to it: it is not obligatory because 
there is coercion."'13 
Furthermore, if intrinsic legal justice is identical in meaning with intrinsic 
moral goodness for the particular individual, as is the case when "intrinsically 
good" has a realistic epistemological meaning the same for all knowers, then 
the fact that, in any legal system, its norms are obligatory for everyone in the 
system becomes meaningful. In short, legal induction presents no problem for 
anyone holding this intuitive theory of ethics and law. Therefore, when one 
interprets the meaning of intrinsic goodness after the manner of G. E. Moore, 
not merely morals but also law become altered accordingly. 
Kant provided independent confirmation of a similar conclusion. In his 
Critique of Pure Reason he gave a philosophical analysis of the descriptive 
language of Newtonian mathematical physics and also of Western common 
sense. This analysis showed that both contain two different kinds of meaning- 
ful words. One kind is that noted in Locke's Essay and analytically designated 
above in the linguistic premise (lEp)RE of Judge Hand's Austinian legal posi- 
tivism. Kant called meaning given in this way "a posteriori" The writer calls 
concepts, the entire meaning of which is of this kind, "concepts by intuition,"'4 
where by "intuition" is meant the direct sensing or immediate experiencing 
of something entirely empirical. (G. E. Moore's intuitively known "good," be- 
ing nonempirical, is not, therefore, a concept by intuition in the writer's sense 
of these words.) 
The other type of meaning which Kant noted to be present in Newton's 
physics is theoretically introduced, being brought by the scientist or observer 
as knower to the observed a posterior data. Kant called concepts, the entire 
meaning of which is of this kind, "a priori." The writer, in order to leave 
open the question whether they are (a) Kantian categorical, (b) neo-Kantian 
merely hypothetical or (c) logically realistic,'5 indirectly and pragmatically 
tested, theoretical constructs, calls them "concepts by postulation that are con- 
cepts by intellection.'s The latter clause is added to express the fact that, be- 
ing syntactically constructed, these concepts are imageless and hence nonem- 
pirical apart from their "epistemic correlations,'7 or "rules of correspond- 
ence"''8 with a posterior data. In Kant's interpretation, (a) just above, 
gives his idealistic epistemological theory of descriptive knowledge. It also en- 
abled him, and Kelsen after him, to find the meaning of normative words in the 
13. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 17 (1953). 
14. NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES ch. 5 (1947). 
15. NORTHROP, PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PRACTICAL POLITICS Ch. 3 (1960). 
16. NORTHROP, THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES ch. 5 (1947). 
17. Id., ch. 7. 
18. MARGENAU, THE NATURE OF PHYSICAL REALITY 60 (1950). 
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theoretically introduced constructs, thereby explaining why the radically em- 
pirical "is," which is the object of the normative judgment, can never give an 
"ought." Thus, Kant avoided the naturalistic fallacy, at least in the form in 
which it occurs in Locke's Essay, and in Hume, Bentham and Judge Hand's 
Austinian legal positivism. 
As articulated by Kant, the result was his "categorical imperative" in 
morals and his formal theory of law. Immediately it no longer was a mystery 
why it is an inescapable fact of anyone's moral experience, as G. E. Moore 
showed by his "open question" argument,'9 that the moral question whether 
one should do what is most pleasant or something else is a genuinely mean- 
ingful one as it cannot be if the meaning of the word "good" is identical with 
that of the word "pleasant." 
Although the present account of the source and content of Kant's imageless 
scientific constructs is different from what he supposed, the fact that they exist 
and do not reduce to the concepts by intuition referring entirely to empirical 
data is now generally recognized by physicists and philosophers of physics 
such as Einstein, Professor Henry Margenau, Ernest Nagel, the writer and 
even today's logical positivists.20 The logical positivists' acceptance of the 
irreducibility of concepts by postulation to concepts by intuition is especially 
convincing, because in their initial radically empirical period of Rudolf Car- 
nap's Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt and their middle naive realistic period 
of von Neurath's "physicalism" they gave the very strong impression they 
believed the contrary. 
The remarkable thing about Kant's theory of morals and law is that it used 
the concept of law to define even the personally good. By contrast, in both 
Bentham's radically empirical, introspective, psychological theory and G. E. 
Moore's nonempirical, intuitive theory, the meaning of the moral word "good" 
is identified with an atomistic property. Being atomistic, it entailed nothing 
other than itself in one's own or any other person's moral experience. In 
short, the idea of law was not in it. This is why Bentham's atomistic "good" 
tended to make morals, economics, law and politics laissez faire and relative 
to the introspections of the private person. It is also why G. E. Moore, even 
when he arbitrarily assumed that his atomistic, nonempirical property, "good," 
is identical for all knowers, could provide no criterion for saying when it is 
true to predicate it of anything. Consequently, even if this good exists, it is 
morally and legally useless. 
Applied to law, both of the atomistic theories of the meaning of normative 
words have another fatal weakness. As Hume noted, the senses do not give 
us the idea of law. They give at best only what is true for a very large some, 
never for all instances. Consequently, no atomistic theory of the meaning of 
normative words can account for the most evident thing about law, namely 
19. MOORE, op. cit. supra note 11, at 43. 
20. Martin, On Semantical Rules and Definable Predicates, 10 PHIL. STUDIES 33 
(1959); MARGENAU, op. cit. supra note 18; EINSTEIN, THE WORLD As I SEE IT (1934); 
Grunbaum, The Dukemian Argument, 27 PHIL. Sci. 75-87 (1960). 
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its lawfulness; only a theory which conceives of at least some of the words of 
its language as theoretically introduced constructs can do so. This Kant saw. 
The remarkable thing, however, is that he also saw that it is as true for per- 
sonal morals as it is for law. This occurred in his "categorical imperative" 
which requires one to judge the goodness of one's conduct from the theoreti- 
cally conceived standpoint of what it would look like were it a universal law 
of conduct practiced by everybody. That this is not the empty formula many 
critics, ignorant or unmindful of theoretical constructs in science, have tried 
to make it out to be, is shown by the following more concrete question which 
anyone must ask himself if he accepts this moral theory. This question is: 
Would I like it if what I now introspect to be the most pleasant thing to do 
to my neighbor John Brown were done by him to me? If the answer to this 
question is No, the categorical imperative requires me to conclude morally that 
however pleasing such conduct would be either for me or for the majority of 
people, such conduct is bad. 
In order to see why the extension of the scientific language of constructs 
from the natural sciences to morals and law, which occurred in Kant's Critique 
of Practical Reason and his Philosophy of Law, leads to such a moral and 
legal theory, let us compare Kant's conception of these constructs in the 
natural sciences with the contemporary conception. For Kant, what distin- 
guished "concepts by postulation" from "concepts by intuition" is that the 
former, unlike the latter, were characterized by Allgemeinheit (universality) 
and Notwendigkeit (necessity). 
By Notwendigkeit he meant that the constructs which the scientist and also 
the person of common sense, as knower, theoretically introduce are necessities 
of his thinking; he has no choice but to think about the a posterior data given 
through the senses in this way. At the time Kant reached this conclusion it 
was by no means absurd or unreasonable. His reading of Hume, he tells us, 
awoke him from his "dogmatic slumbers" by making him aware of the con- 
cepts by intuition to which our common-sense beliefs and Newton's physics 
would have to restrict themselves, if concepts by intuition were the only mean- 
ingful concepts that exist. Being an expert creative mathematical physicist who 
knew the technical meaning of the concepts in Newton's physics,21 Kant 
realized that its theoretical meaningful words and mathematical symbols were 
of a quite different kind. Since these theoretically introduced, meaningful con- 
cepts are not given to the scientist as knower through his senses nor definable 
in terms of such a posteriori concepts by intuition, Kant concluded that they 
must be brought as necessities of the knower's thinking to the data given 
through the senses, precisely in the manner in which today the logic built into 
a calculating machine is a necessity of its procedure in calculating with respect 
to the a posterior information fed into the machine through its physical 
"sense" organs. We now know that this Kantian thesis that concepts by postu- 
21. Northrop, Natural Science and the Critical Philosophy of Kant, THE HERITAGE 
OF KANT 39 (Whitney & Bowers ed. 1939). 
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lation are characterized by Notwendigkeit needs radical modification. Also the 
formal, substantive content of these constructs is, in the theory of relativity 
and quantum mechanics, quite different from what Kant supposed. Even so, 
the reference to calculating machines reminds us that human beings possess 
nervous systems and, as the late John von Neumann has pointed out,22 human 
nervous systems have a logic built into them which any human being brings 
to the a posterior "information" given to him by his senses, as well as the 
possible hypothetic "logics" that may be "programmed in" by education or 
which the creative logician and pure mathematician may himself construct. 
With respect to the Allgemeinheit of these theoretical constructs, Kant is 
still correct. As any theoretical physicist knows, the experimentally verified, 
mathematically constructed, imageless laws of mathematical physics are always 
characterized by being preceded by universally quantified entity variables. 
Applied to law, therefore, Kant's theory had no difficulty in solving the afore- 
mentioned problem of legal induction. This is the case because these theoreti- 
cal constructs are what Earl Russell has called "incomplete symbols." This 
does not mean that their meaning is partial or ambiguous or in any way in- 
complete. What it means, instead, is that unlike the concepts by intuition of 
a radically empirical or a naive realistic theory of the meaning of all words, 
an "incomplete symbol" has no meaning if treated in isolation, apart from the 
imageless axioms or postulates in terms of which its theoretical meaning is 
constructed and completely specified. Since such axioms are what we mean by 
laws and such lawfully constructed entities have no meaning other than what 
their axioms assign to them, it follows that such laws hold for all instances 
of their entity variables. Hence, such constructs are characterized by All- 
gemeinheit. 
When the discovery was made that there are other geometries than that of 
Euclid and hence that there is more than one "form of sensibility" space and 
that there are alternative "logics," it was revealed that the "categories" which 
Kant supposed to be a priori are merely hypothetical. Epistemic correlation 
of their respectively deduced consequences with a posterior data is thus re- 
quired to make the crucial experiments possible by means of which one opera- 
tionally determines which of the hypothetical possibilities is the empirically 
confirmed one. The result of this discovery was neo-Kantianism. Applied to 
law, somewhat uncritically as the following will show, this gave the legal posi- 
tivism of Kelsen. 
As noted above, Kelsen's positivism differs fundamentally from that of Aus- 
tin, Hobbes, Thayer and Judge Learned Hand. This difference is at least 
twofold: First, whereas Austinian legal positivism derives from the British em- 
piricism of Locke's Essay, that of Kelsen is the product of Continental ration- 
alism stemming from Descartes by way of Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant. Second, 
as with Kant, G. E. Moore, Morris and Felix Cohen and the contemporary 
British Kelsenian legal positivists, the "ought" and its amputations do not 
22. VON NEUMANN, THE COMPUTER AND THE BRmN (1958). 
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define away and cannot be derived from any merely empirical "is," be it that 
of Hobbes materialistic public club or the "preferences, arbitrary and im- 
perative" of Holmes and Judge Hand. 
Therefore, "ought-to-be-ness" is for Kelsen a primitive presupposition of 
any legal system. To hope to understand law by regarding it as merely an 
empirical science concerned with causal relations between nonnormatively 
described events is, consequently, to attempt the impossible. Hence Holmes' 
famous dictum, that by law he means nothing more than the modest prediction 
of what the judge will do, rests on the error of confusing (1) the nonnor- 
mative relation of causality with (2) the quite different normative relation of 
imputative "ought-to-be-ness" between (a) the positive legal rules of the par- 
ticular legal system, (b) the judge in his official capacity, subject to the pro- 
cedural and substantive restraints of these rules, and (c) the defendant being 
judged in a particular case. This is the point of Kelsen's classic paper, 
"Causality and Imputation."23 
Item (b) in this imputative relation is important. As Professor Alf Ross 
of the University of Copenhagen, who differs with Kelsen on other points, 
has noted, the extreme American legal realism of Gray and the Jerome Frank 
of Law and the Modern Mind committed the additional error of failing to 
distinguish between (i) what the judge does in his official capacity and (ii) 
the same thing done unofficially, i.e., the same judgment of the same case 
made, let us say, by the judge over cocktails in his club.24 Only what the 
judge does officially is law. But to make a judgment officially is not merely 
to make it qua its character as a nonnormatively described and perhaps causal- 
ly predictable event, but to make it subject to the presupposed imputative 
ought-to-be-ness of the norms of the particular positive legal system of which 
one is a part, which ought-to-be-ness the judge explicitly accepts in his oath 
of office and which every youth implicitly accepts when he or she becomes of 
age to take on complete citizenship. 
From this, Kelsen concludes that law is a science but not, even in part, a 
science referring to nonofficial and nonnormative empirical data. It is the 
science which has as its first premise, or Grundnorm, the lawful ought-to-be- 
ness which any legal system whatever presupposes, and has as its second 
premise the neo-Kantian hypothetical, theoretically introduced, substantive nor- 
mative content of the "First Constitution" of the legal system in question. 
Law then is the science which presupposes this first premise, and empirically 
determines the substantive content of both the second premise and what sub- 
sequent official, positive, normative legislative statutes and judicial judgments 
have occurred within the authorizations given by the norms of the First Con- 
stitution. In short, as Professor Alf Ross has noted, law for Kelsen is the 
positive science of such sollen (i.e., ought-to-be) sentences. 
23. KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 324-49 (1957). See also the author's review of WHAT 
IS JUSTICE? by Hans Kelsen, 44 VA. L. REV. 815 (1958). 
24. See Ross, TOWARDS A REALISTIC JURISPRUDENCE 70 (1946), for his example of 
the "engineer" as unofficial judge. 
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Because of the second premise, to say of any object of legal judgment that 
"x is just or unjust" is always to presuppose the particular legal system in 
which the judgment is made. Hence, as with Austinian legal positivism, it 
is self-contradictory and therefore meaningless to talk about the particular 
legal system as a whole being just or unjust. Professor H. L. A. Hart gives 
expression to this thesis when he analyzes A's right with respect to B in a 
particular legal document in terms of "There exists a legal system...."25 
It is in this sense of equating law with the empirical science of the posi- 
tive law that it is correct to refer to both Kelsen's theory of law and that 
of Austin, Hobbes and Judge Hand as "legal positivism." Both theories are 
legally positivistic in the sense that law is conceived as nothing but the em- 
pirical science of the positive law and in the more concrete sense that to judge 
anything to be just is equivalent to affirming that it is in accord with the posi- 
tive law. From this it follows that it is self-contradictory and hence meaning- 
less to talk about the positive law itself being legally unjust. 
Kelsen is not a legal positivist, however, in the linguistic or epistemological, 
as distinct from the positive legal, sense of the word "positivism." In other 
words, because of his neo-Kantianism and its constructs, he rejects the thesis 
of Austin and Hand, deriving from Locke's Essay, that the meaning of the 
moral word "good" or the legal expression "officially just" must be identified 
with, or defined in terms of, radically empirical data. The reason, let it be 
repeated, is twofold. First, the radical empiricist, Hume, as well as Kant, has 
made it clear that no "ought" can be derived from an empirical "is." Hence 
the idea of legal obligation must be taken as a primitive concept in positive 
legal science. Second, legal language contains constructs, i.e., concepts by 
postulation as well as concepts by intuition. 
This has the following effect upon the legal syllogism of the judge's judg- 
ment. Under the Austinian version of legal positivism, the judicial syllogism 
contains only three propositions. 
First premise: the norms of the positive law are such and such. 
Second premise: the facts of the case show the defendant's conduct to be 
incompatible with the first premise. 
Conclusion: ergo, the defendant is guilty. 
Kelsen noted, however, that if the normative words in the first premise identi- 
fy with, or are defined in terms of, nonnormative words, as is the case with 
Austinianism, then the first premise refers only to a nonnormative "is." Since 
the second premise does the same, there is no "ought" word in either premise. 
Consequently, the obligation of the defendant to be judged by the norms of the 
positive law, which the conclusion assumes, does not follow since not even two 
"is" sentences can give an "ought" sentence. Kelsen realized, therefore, that 
two things must be accepted. First, the normative words of the first premise 
cannot be identified with, or defined in terms of, nonnormative "is" words. 
Second, a third premise-the norms of the positive law ought to be obeyed- 
25. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence, 70 L.Q. REV. 37-60 (1954). 
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must be added to the judicial syllogism since then and only then does the 
judge's judgment follow. 
Even this assumes, however, as Kelsen clearly realized, that the ought-to- 
be-ness which any legal system presupposes is one that is universally prescrip- 
tive for everybody in the legal system. What is the ground for this assump- 
tion ? It is at this point, as well as in his interpretation of the meaning of the 
first premise, that Kelsen's neo-Kantianism, with its theoretically introduced 
constructs, becomes essential to his legal positivism because, as shown above, 
such constructs are characterized by universality. It follows that to be any 
legal person in the positive legal system in question means to be a person for 
whom its positive legal rules hold. 
This way of solving the problem of legal induction is quite different from 
that of Felix Cohen. An examination of the difference will explain why the 
conceptions of the relation between law and morals of Kelsen and Cohen are 
so different also. 
We have just noted that Kelsen's solution derives from Kant's observation 
that an adequate theory not merely of law, but also of morals, entails the idea 
of law, that is, the idea of the person judging himself in terms of a law which 
is the same for all persons. When his neo-Kantianism led Kelsen to regard 
ought-to-be-ness as merely a hypothetical maxim relative to the particular cul- 
tural and legal system, rather than a categorical imperative, then legal justice 
became relative also. This makes it meaningless to say that the positive law, 
for example, of the Hitlerian German legal system is less just than that of Ade- 
nauer's Germany even though the moral judgment of persons in both legal 
systems was and is to the contrary. Hence, for Kelsen and Professor H. L. A. 
Hart, as well as for Judge Hand's Austinian legal positivism, morals and law 
are two different things. 
Felix Cohen, it will be recalled, solved the problem of legal induction as 
follows: First, appealing to G. E. Moore's distinction between intrinsic and 
instrumental values, he drew the distinction in law between instrumental and 
intrinsic legal justice. Second, he defined intrinsic legal justice in terms of 
moral goodness, where "goodness" means G. E. Moore's nonempirical, and 
not further analyzable, ethical property. Because Moore's realistic theory of 
the meaning of words entails that "good" is the same for all knowers any- 
where, it followed that Cohen's definition of intrinsic legal justice (the goal 
of any legal system as distinct from its instrumental legal concepts) in terms 
of Moore's moral property "good" entails a meaning for the intrinsic, or goal 
value, part of law which is the same for all persons and therefore meaning- 
fully prescriptive, not merely for everyone in the legal system, but anyone any- 
where. This made it meaningful to judge legally the substantive normative 
content of one's own, or any other, legal system's positive law. 
Furthermore, when Felix Cohen identified intrinsic legal justice, which the 
judge must use as his first premise in interpreting the legality of any legal 
language in deciding any case, with Moore's intrinsic, personal moral good- 
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ness, the same for anyone anywhere, the standards of measurement for the 
judge's personal moral judgment and his official legal judgment become iden- 
tical. Cohen concluded, therefore, that a careful analysis of what the words 
"law" and "morals" mean shows that the legally positivistic judge does not 
merely err when he conceives of himself as a schizophrenic moral Mr. Hyde 
and a legal Mr. Jekyll, but also, like schizophrenics generally, he deludes him- 
self when he thinks that he does so. What actually happened with either the 
Austinian or Kelsenian judge, Cohen believed, was that inevitably, because of 
the normative ambiguities of positive legal language, he more or less uncon- 
sciously and surreptitiously slipped in outmoded and uncritically examined 
personal moral judgments in the name of merely declaring the positive law. 
Nevertheless, Felix Cohen's own legal theory gives us reasons for doubting 
that this intuitive theory of law and morals and its method of solving the 
problem of legal induction is the correct one. This becomes evident when one 
notes (1) what he says about the moral dangers in Moore's intuitive theory 
of the meaning of the word "good" and (2) the restrictions which he placed 
upon Moore's theory in order to avoid these dangers. 
The danger in any intuitive theory of morals or law is that when one's nor- 
mative judgment becomes thus freed from any further empirical test or the- 
oretical analysis, bigotry and the spirit of the inquisitor is likely to arise. To 
prevent this, Cohen required that, before the word "good" is predicated of any 
object of moral or legal judgment, the resulting proposition be subjected to the 
test of Bentham's hedonistic principle-"the greatest pleasure of the greatest 
number of people." But Cohen avoided the naturalistic fallacy only by recom- 
mitting it again, since Bentham's theory is the thesis that the meaning of the 
word "good" is identical with the meaning of the word "pleasure." The second 
defect in any theory of law that is based on Moore's way of avoiding the 
naturalistic fallacy is that it fails to achieve what Moore intended it to achieve, 
namely, to keep the normative sentences of morals and law cognitive; that is, 
sentences of which it is meaningful to say that they are true or false. If, as 
the naturalistic fallacy shows, normative assertions are synthetic statements, 
then isn't it the case that the test of their truth or falsity must be empirical? 
But Moore's theory of the meaning of the word "good" is that it refers to 
nothing empirical. Consequently, the test cannot be empirical. 
The only escape would seem to be that any meaningfully true sentence with 
the word "good" as its predicate is known to be true because the sentence is 
a synthetic a priori proposition. But this requires Kant's categorically a priori 
idealistic epistemology and theory of language for its validity, whereas Moore's 
theory of knowledge, as we have noted, was naive realistic. Moreover, Felix 
Cohen, so far as the writer has been able to discover, did not believe there 
were any synthetic a priori propositions in either the normative or the natural 
sciences. Otherwise there would be no need to appeal to Bentham's hedonism 
to determine whether it was cognitively warrantable to predicate the word 
"good" of anything. 
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The third defect in Moore's way of avoiding the naturalistic fallacy is that, 
were his nonempirical intuitive theory of the meaning of the word "good" 
correct, which in his realistic interpretation of its meaning makes "good" the 
same for all persons, it is difficult to understand the evident fact that one per- 
son affirms an object of moral judgment to be good whereas another person 
affirms that same object to be bad. If the meaning of the word "good" is iden- 
tical for both and if it is a realistic predicate of the object, then such predica- 
tions by different people should not occur. We conclude, therefore, that this 
nonempirical intuitive theory of the meaning of normative words in both morals 
and law leaves meaningless the truth and falsity of legal and ethical judgments 
and hence fails to achieve the purpose for which it was introduced. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the principle effect of G. E. Moore's 
demonstration that a fallacy occurs if the meaning of any normative word is 
identified with, or defined in terms of, any empirical fact has been to convince 
many contemporary philosophical analysts that he is correct in using the na- 
turalistic fallacy to demonstrate that sentences of moral and legal language are 
synthetic but errs in his assumption that such synthetic sentences are true or 
false. Instead, the nonanalytic meanings of the predicate terms "good" and 
"legally just" are "emotive," "hortatory," "ejaculatory" or "persuasive." This 
theory of law and morals we shall call "normative noncognitivism." Its very 
able representatives are the English and American analytic philosophers A. J. 
Ayer and Charles L. Stevenson in morals and value theory generally and Alf 
Ross in law.26 
But if Ross is a legal noncognitivist, why does he agree with Kelsen on the 
point noted above with respect to the sollen (ought-to-be) sentences of posi- 
tive law? The answer appears to be that this is but part of Ross's position. 
Whereas Kelsen thinks that law is nothing but the positive science of such 
sollen sentences in a particular legal system, Ross recognizes also the unofficial 
sein (nonnormative "is"). Because of the normative ambiguities in official 
legal language and because it is analyzed by and applied to people who are 
not perfect official "ought-to-be's," the all-too-human, unofficial sein factor plays 
an important role in law, and it is the great merit of the American legal realists 
to have seen this. Their only error occurred when some of them went to the 
opposite extreme from Kelsen, by attempting to make law nothing but the 
empirical science of the unofficial nonnormative "is." When the late Karl 
Llewellyn,27 the pioneer in American legal realism, told us that his early em- 
phasis upon the study of what judges actually do in fact, as well as the official 
reasons they give for what they do, never entailed the rejection of the equal 
importance of the "ought" of the official positive law, his version of American 
legal realism may well be very close to that of Professor Ross. In any event, 
26. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1948); STEVENSON, ETHICS AND LAN- 
GUAGE (1944); Ross, op. cit. supra note 24; Ross, On the Logical Nature of Propositions 
of Value, 11 THEORIA 172-210; Ross, ON LAW AND JUSTICE (1959). 
27. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930); LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, THE CHEY- 
ENNE WAY (1941). 
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Ross's position is that an adequate theory of law must pay attention to its 
unofficial sein as well as to its official sollen part and hence must combine 
American legal realism with Kelsen's legal positivism. 
He notes, however, that this is by no means easy. Kelsen's theory conceives 
of law as the science of official, normative sollen sentences. Extreme legal 
realism is the thesis that law is the science of unofficial nonnormative sein 
sentences. The combination of any two sciences is a science. Consequently, the 
combination of the American legal realists' science of sein sentences with Kel- 
sen's science of sollen sentences must produce a legal science that is conceived 
of as the science of sein-sollen sentences. The result, however, as Ross shows, 
is not a science, but a theory of law that is self-contradictory.28 
The proof that this is the case can be summarized as follows: If any one 
of these sein-sollen sentences is a scientific sentence, then it must be meaning- 
ful both theoretically and operationally to say that it is true or false. But, as 
we have shown above, such a sentence is synthetic-its normative sollen pred- 
icate meaning something other than its sein subject term. Thus the test of its 
truth must be either (a) empirical or (b) it is true a priori. Both the Ameri- 
can legal realists and Kelsen, however, deny the existence of synthetic prop- 
ositions that are true a priori. Therefore, the test must be empirical. But if 
this is the case, then to say that the synthetic sein-sollen sentence is true is to 
say that it must conform to some directly observable or indirectly confirmable 
empirical fact. The result, in the case of sein-sollen sentences which are em- 
pirically true, is to populate the universe with self-contradictory, Pickwickian 
fats normatifs 29 (nonnormative-normative facts), i.e., empirical facts which 
both are and are not what they are. For, if the empirical fait normatif is to 
confirm empirically the nonnormative American legal realistic sein portion of 
the sein-sollen sentence, it must be completely an unofficial nonnormative sein 
fact; whereas, if it is to confirm the Kelsenian official sollen portion of the 
sentence, it must not be this nonnormative sein fact, but what it ought to be. 
Hence, the Gurvitchean notion of fats normatifs, which is necessary to make 
the empirical test of these synthetic sein-sollen sentences meaningful, is a self- 
contradictory notion. Consequently, the theory of law which conceives it as 
the science which results from combining the American legal realists' science 
of sein sentences with Kelsen's science of sollen sentences is a self-contradic- 
tory legal theory also. 
As examples of such or similar legal theories which require the explicit or 
implicit self-contradictory notion of fats normatifs to justify their theory that 
the synthetic sein-sollen sentences of morals and laws are meaningfully true 
or false, Alf Ross cites not merely Gurvitch but also the non-neo-Kantian fol- 
lowers of Kant. The Hegelian and Marxist identification of the historical 
"ought-to-be" with the inevitable "is," is another example. Among Americans, 
Professor Lon Fuller's empirical "is-ought" facts, which he will not allow Pro- 
28. Ross, op. cit. supra note 24. 
29. Id., at 50-51. 
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fessor Ernest Nagel to analyze into a nonnormative "is" fact which is empirical 
and "ought" factor which must be separated from it if confusion is not to occur, 
would appear to be another example.30 
Nevertheless, Ross maintains that these moral philosophers and lawyers are 
the only ones among traditional theorists who see the two different factors in 
legal and moral experience for which any adequate theory must account. Their 
only error is their supposition that their own theory, with its explicit or im- 
plicit self-contradictory notion of faits normcatifs, is this adequate theory. He 
concludes therefore that (1) the theory of law which combines American legal 
realism with Kelsenian legal positivism and conceives the resulting synthetic 
sein-sollen sentences to be meaningfully true or false, i.e., cognitive scientific 
assertions, is a self-contradictory theory, and (2) nevertheless no theory 
of law is adequate unless it combines American legal realism with Kelsenian 
legal positivism. 
But how are these two conclusions to be reconciled? Ross answers this 
question by pointing out that the contradiction of the faits normatifs version 
of the combination arises from assuming that its scientific sein-sollen sentences 
are meaningfully true or false. A non-self-contradictory combination of Ameri- 
can legal realism and Kelsen's legal positivism is obtained, therefore, when 
one assumes that the normative sollen words in the synthetic sein-sollen sen- 
tences are hortatory, ejaculatory or persuasive rather than empirically cogni- 
tive in their meaning.31 Thus Ross's theory of law, which he extends to 
morals and to aesthetics also, is identical with the one arrived at by Professors 
Ayer and Stevenson. 
That these noncognitivists are brilliant moral and legal theorists is evident. 
That they are correct on the following points is equally evident, as has been 
shown by the foregoing analysis of their own and other theories: (1) Sein-sollen 
sentences are synthetic. (2) To save the cognitive meaning of such synthetic 
sentences by thinking they refer to a sein-sollen fait normatif is a self-contra- 
dictory notion. 
Even so, two things are the case: First, for all its merits, this noncognitive 
theory, when taken seriously in law or pursued to its logical consequences in 
either morals or law, has fatal defects. Second, there is an alternative theory 
of the combination of American legal realism with Kelsen's legal positivism 
which avoids the contradiction involved in the notion of fait normatif while 
also having the merit of keeping moral and legal sein-sollen sentences cogni- 
tive. This theory is that the empirical fact to which the sein subject term of 
the synthetic sein-sollen sentence refers for its cognitive empirical meaning is 
30. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NATURAL L.F. 68-76 (1958); Nagel, 
On the Fusion of Fact and Value, 3 NATURAL L.F. 77-81 (1958); Fuller, A Rejoinder 
to Professor Nagel, 3 NATURAL L.F. 82-104 (1958); Nagel, Fact, Value, and Human 
Purpose, 4 NATURAL L.F. 26-43 (1959). 
31. Ross, op. cit. supra note 24; Ross, On the Logical Nature of Propositions of 
Value, supra note 26. 
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a different empirical fact from the empirical facts to which the sollen words 
of the synthetic sentence refer for their empirical cognitive meaning. Else- 
where I have called the class of empirical facts to which the sein term refers, 
"second-order facts," and the class of empirical facts to which the sollen words 
refer, "first-order facts."32 
The demonstration of the fatal weakness in any cognitive moral and legal 
theory is too technical and lengthy an undertaking to pursue here. Hence we 
shall restrict ourselves to clarifying and indicating the reasons for our alter- 
native theory. To this end, two things are important: (1) The theory of 
morals and law which Sir Henry Maine called "law of Status." (2) The quite 
different conception of morals and law which expressed itself in what Sir 
Henry has described as a "movement from Status to Contract."33 
The Law, Morals and Religion of a Status Society 
In any society, regardless of the theory of morals, law and religion which 
most of its people profess and practice, the people over time fall into different 
classes, one of any two of which is regarded as enjoying a normatively higher 
position in society than the other. To avoid the prevalent error of some com- 
parative lawyers and anthropologists of confusing status in this omnipresent 
generic sense with Status in Maine's specific sense of a law of Status morals, 
law and religion, we shall use the uncapitalized word to express the generic 
meaning and the capitalized word for his specific meaning. A morals, law and 
religion within this latter meaning "has for its units, not individuals, but 
groups of men united by the reality or the fiction of blood-relationship."34 
What this means concretely becomes evident when one notes that in such 
a community neither one's pleasures, approvals, preferences or assents, nor 
one's noncognitive ejaculations are relevant to one's moral, legal or religious 
rights and obligations. Instead, these rights, in at least a major part, are deter- 
mined at birth by one's sex and family standing (e.g., primogeniture) and by the 
race of one's ancestors in their relation to the tribe and race of the first families of 
the nation. Webster's dictionary gives expression to the fact that the morals 
and law of all nations were originally of this Status type when it lists the word 
"tribe" as the first equivalent of the word "nation." 
If, in such a nation, the race or the color of skin of one's ancestors is not 
that of the first families, then castes exist and one cannot expect one's moral, 
legal, religious or educational rights or duties to be equal to those of one's 
neighbor of a different color of skin who is a blood descendant of the first 
families. Moreover, even with the children of the first families, if the society is 
completely patriarchal, only sons will receive an education and among them 
only the eldest sons will receive the best education. The reason is that in such 
a society the best goes to those carrying the greatest responsibilities and these 
32. NORTHROP, op. cit. supra note 6, ch. 19. 
33. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 151 (1908). 
34. Id. at 163. 
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are always the eldest sons in the patriarchal families and the eldest sons of the 
first families in the state since they have to administer its army, religion, gov- 
ernment and law. 
Consequently, to ask in such a society whether a person is a good person is 
equivalent to asking what his or her breeding is. Also, in any legal dispute, 
the judge merely declares for the most part what he finds when he has the 
genealogical tables of the disputants before him, or, apart from these tables, 
what he knows of their representative castes by their color of skin or caste 
marks. Usually, however, appeal to the judge is unnecessary, since the mem- 
bers of each race and caste know their respective "places," rights and duties 
and the customs of the Status living law by habit. When the system is purely 
matriarchal, the corresponding rights, privileges, duties and obligations go to 
the eldest daughters. Because there are many different possible permutations 
of matriarchal and patriarchal factors in a Status society, there are many 
varieties of such societies. 
That the ancestors of all of us originally believed and practiced such a 
morals, law and religion can be confirmed by reading the Old Testament or 
Fustel de Coulanges' Ancient City and C. W. Westrup's more comprehensive 
and recent Introduction to Early Roman Law, which describes the Patria 
Potestas of The Patriarchal Joint Family in the ancient Roman world before 
Western legal science, in the sense of Sir Henry Maine's law of Contract, was 
discovered and partially articulated. An Asian example is the Hindu's Laws 
of Manu.85 A 17th century English example is to be found in Sir Robert Fil- 
mer's Patriarcha.36 
Recently, the English historian, Mr. Peter Laslett, has shown that this 
book is not as absurd as it appears to be when approached only through Locke 
(as given in Book I of his classic Of Civil Government) instead of from 
the standpoint of the patriarchal, theocratic, Canterburian Christian regal and 
aristocratic customs of early 17th century England. Viewed in the latter con- 
text, Patriarcha is not merely a description of the morals, law, Christianity 
and politics of an era which had these customs, but also of what Sir Robert in 
fact did and was obligated to do in administering the law in the Assizes at 
Maidstone and advising and supporting both the Archbishop of Canterbury 
as the head of the Established Church of England and the Crown as the head 
of the State. 
Mr. Laslett has shown also that it was members of Sir Robert's family, and 
others like it, who created the Virginia Company and whose sons (usually the 
younger ones) and daughters carried this conception and practice of morals, 
law and Christianity into Virginia, from where it spread throughout the Old 
South. Mr. Laslett's first-hand study of the parish records in Virginia revealed 
also that practically all the present well-known Virginian families, who, in- 
cidentally, still refer to themselves as the "F.F.V.'s," are literal blood descend- 
35. 25 MT LER, THE SACRED BooKs OF THE EAST, THE LAWS OF MANU (1886). 
36. FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER POLITICAL WORKS 1-46 (1949). 
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ants of Sir Robert or his "cousins" who, like Sir Robert, were members of 
the gentry of Kent and Essex.37 
It is not necessary to point out that a quite different and incompatible 
morals and law of the law of Contract type came into the American Federal 
legal system through the influence of Southerners such as Jefferson, Madison 
and Washington and Northerners such as Franklin, the Adamses and Hamil- 
ton. It is likely that it is the conflict within the present Southerner between 
the law of Status Filmerian and the law of Contract Jeffersonian parts of him- 
self which is the source of much of his irritation and even bitterness today 
with respect to the recent unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in the desegregation cases-decisions which express the morals, 
law and religion of a law of Contract society. 
We can best understand the reasons which led our ancient predecessors to 
believe in the morals, law and Judaic-Christianity of a law of Status com- 
munity if we compare it with the legal philosophy of Judge Hand's Austinian- 
ism. The latter philosophy, we have noted, rests on radical empiricism with 
respect to the source of the meaning of all words and on radically empirical 
data of introspective psychology, such as pleasures, interests or approvals, with 
respect to the identification of the meaning of the words "good" and "bad" 
in personal morality. Thus, the legal positivist's concept of the person is that 
of the introspected flow-of-consciousness self of Hume and James, a purely 
private, moral and legal person in no way observable publicly. The moral and 
legal person in a law of Status legal community is the publicly sensed biolog- 
ical person. This means that the linguistic premise of a Status legal community 
is naive realism, the theory that the meaning of words refers to public objects 
and properties, the same for all knowers and that these public properties are 
sensed. In short, whereas the modern legal positivists identify the meaning of 
all normative words with the empirical data of introspective psychological 
science, the adherents of a Status law, morality and religion identify them with 
the naive realistic, publicly meaningful facts of natural history and biological 
science. 
Clearly, there is nor a priori reason for choosing one of these identifications 
rather than the other. Either theory is arbitrary. Moreover, both theories com- 
mit the naturalistic fallacy. 
The Status theory has the advantage, however, of making the meaning of 
all moral and legal words objective. Consequently, the morally good and the 
legally just are identical, and neither is relative to the evaluator. Also, because 
all values are tied to one's race, religion is essentially connected with one's 
ancestors. In the family, the religious symbol is the fire of the family hearth. 
In the nation, it is the tribal fire. Consequently, in such a morality and law, 
God tends to be conceived provincially as a God primarily of one's own tribe 
and its race. 
37. Laslett, Sir Robert Filmer: The Man versus the Whig Myth, 5 WILLIAM AND 
MARY Q. 523-46 (1948); The Gentry of Kent in 1640, 9 CAMBRIDGE HIST. J. 148-64 
(1948). 
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This connection between Status law and literature is revealed in the ancient 
Greek tragedies. Aeschylus in his Eumenides has Apollo say: "The mother 
of what is called her child is not its parent, but only the nurse of the newly 
implanted germ. The begetter is the parent. She, a stranger, doth but preserve 
the little creature, except God shall blight its birth."38 This statement affirms 
the norms of a patriarchal legal system and roots them in a theory of biological 
heredity. This genetic theory is that the inherited traits of the offspring are 
transmitted from generation to generation solely by the genes of the male line. 
Because of the identification of normative words with the facts of naive real- 
istic biological science, it is then inferred that, since God made human beings 
this way, the obligation of the wife and daughters to accept the patriarchal 
authority of the male in family, church and state is absolute and the obligation 
of all to keep the patriarchal male line purely bred is equally a Divine duty 
and the Patriarch's Divine right.39 
Why do those of us who have come heavily under the influence of modern 
philosophical, moral and legal thinking no longer believe this theory? One rea- 
son is that we now know the biological theory upon which it rests to be 
false. The female as well as the male contributes to the inherited traits of the 
children. This shows that the meanings of the normative words are not sui 
generis; in the language of G. E. Moore, they are not primitive, unanalyzable, 
intuitively given meanings. This means that our value judgments concerning 
second-order facts of human conduct are a function of our cognitive theory of 
first-order empirical facts in the nonnormative empirical sciences. Another 
reason, just noted, is that the Status theory is incorrect for precisely the same 
reason that the theory of Hume, Austin, Hobbes and Judge Hand is in error; 
it commits the naturalistic fallacy of identifying the meaning of the words 
"morally good" and "legally just" with some arbitrarily chosen empirical fact. 
Historically, however, the reason why we regard the Status theory as absurdly 
nonsensical, and both immoral and unjust, is the evolution of Western law 
which Sir Henry Maine has described as the "movement from Status to Con- 
tract." In what did this shift consist? 
He tells us that it began in Roman law and that it "has been distinguished 
by the gradual dissolution of family dependency, and the growth of individual 
obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, 
as the unit of which civil laws take account."40 Very much more, however, is 
involved. Not only does the individual rather than the family, the tribe and 
the race become the legal person, but, in addition, he conceives of morals, law 
and even God in a novel way. Also, new technical legal concepts, such as jus 
in rem, are introduced. These concepts were made possible by the discovery 
and use in Greek mathematical physics of what above we called "constructs" 
38. Verse 657 (Weir Smyth ed. 1926); see 3 WESTRUP, INTRODUCTION TO EARLY 
ROMAN LAW, PATRIA POTESTAS, 1 The Nascent Law 228 (1939). 
39. For a recent literary example, see Boyd Smith's play about a very humble West 
Virginia family, THE PATRIARCH (1931). 
40. MAINE, op. cit. supra note 33, at 149. 
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or "concepts by postulation" with their novel idea of the elementary individual 
scientific object as a universally quantified entity variable in an imageless, 
axiomatically constructed relation or universal law. Applied to the normative 
sciences, as it was by the Greek and Roman Stoic lawyers, this gave the 
Stoics' thesis that moral and legal man is "cosmopolitan" or "universal" man, 
i.e., the universally quantified variable person, (p), where (p) means any one 
person substitutable for any other in a universally quantified, imageless legal 
relation between persons. 
When this new legal concept of what one means by a legal and moral per- 
son passed through the minds of Jews like Philo and Judaic-Christians like Paul 
into the religious thinking of people, the idea of God underwent a correspond- 
ing shift from Status to cosmopolitan Contract which led to the conception of 
Him not so much as the provincial God of one's ancestors, one's tribe and 
one's race, but as the God of the Gentiles as well as of the Jews, of Negroes 
as well as of Sir Robert Filmer's patriarchal Englishmen and of the conquered 
tribes in the Roman Empire as well as the conquering Roman tribes. In short, 
the Divine Being became the God of all mankind, before Whom differences 
in sex, primogeniture, ancestry or the color of one's skin are religiously irrel- 
evant. Need one wonder, therefore, that the first official Christian church is 
called the "Roman Catholic Church," where "Catholic," when literally under- 
stood and consistently practiced, means freely assenting "universal" or "cos- 
mopolitan" human being, male or female, and "Roman" means the influence 
of secular Rome-that is Roman law on Judaic-Christianity? The interested 
reader will find some of the evidence for this thesis in the chapter called "The 
Stoic Strain in Christianity" in IE. Vernon Arnold's Roman Stoicism.4' 
But let us return to the Greek and Stoic Roman lawyer's concept of the 
legal person as the universally quantified entity variable person, (p), in an 
imageless, theoretically constructed legal relation or law, and note the impact 
which it had on the legal conception of a particular person's right to a thing 
in the evolution of Roman law. The Roman lawyers, such as the Scaevolas 
and their successors, expressed the idea of the legal person as the universally 
quantified person in the phrase "against all the world." Early Roman law was, 
however, of the Status type. Hence, its concept of the person was the naive 
realistic, sensed person, or what, in the language of constructs, one would call 
"a material constant." Similarly, "a thing" meant a naively sensed thing, also 
a material constant. Consequently, a particular person's legal right to a thing 
had to mean his naive realistic possession of that thing. From this it followed 
that if a thief took the thing away from its possessor, there was no meaning 
to saying that the latter still had a legal right to that thing. 
When, however, the shift was made to the legal language of constructs, the 
following was made possible and actually happened. First, rights became de- 
fined not as a relation between a person and a thing, but as a relation between 
persons. But if both persons in the legal relation are material constants, there 
41. ARNOLD, ROMAN STOICISM 408-36 (1911). 
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would be meaning, if A purchased a thing from B, to saying that A had the 
legal right to the thing so far as B is concerned, but not with respect to any- 
one else. In short, A's right to the thing, if a thief C took the thing away from 
him, still remained meaningless. The conception of the legal person as the con- 
struct which is the universally quantified entity variable in an imageless legal 
relation removed this difficulty. A's right to the thing then became conceived 
as a legal relation between A and the universally quantified variable (p) with 
respect to that thing. In other words, A had a right to the thing "against all 
the world," even though the thief had taken the thing away from him. The 
result was the Roman legal contruct jus in rem. 
The evolution of the Roman legal conception of the will is similarly interest- 
ing. Sir Henry Maine has pointed out that in its earliest form if a person A 
wanted certain rights to go to another person B upon A's death, A had no 
alternative but to have the right go immediately to B upon A's execution of 
his will. In other words, the only legal language was that of unconditional in- 
dicative sentences. Diogenes Laertius gives us the well-nigh unbelievable re- 
port that the Greek Stoic Chrysippus wrote some one hundred treatises on 
the formal properties of hypothetical sentences. In his recent remarkable study 
of the mathematical physics of Chrysippus, Professor S. Sambursky of the 
Hebrew University in Jerusalem tells us that one of Chrysippus' most impor- 
tant contributions to Western mathematical physics was his study of the logic 
of disjunctively related theoretical constructs.42 With such a language of hy- 
pothetical and disjunctive legal constructs, the idea of a right passing to one 
or another person, only if a particular contingency occurs, can be easily ex- 
pressed, as it was in the later Roman law of wills and testaments. In short, 
the legal construct called "contingent remainders" became a commonplace in 
Western legal science from that day to the present moment. That this is true 
for many other constructs as well and as true for Anglo-American common 
law as it is of the civil law nations has been shown by the comparative lawyer, 
Professor Lawson, in his book The Rational Strength of English Law.43 This 
"rational strength" is the technical rigor and precision of meaning, the de- 
crease in ambiguity, which is introduced into any science when concepts by 
postulation are substituted for concepts by intuition with the latter concepts 
present also in the radically empirical sense of their meaning as the epistemic 
correlates of the constructs. In this connection, the title of a book which is a 
classic in English law because it removed countless ambiguities, is especially 
interesting-I refer to Fearne's Contingent Remainders.44 
The foregoing considerations have considerable contemporary importance. 
First, they show that the very prevalent attempt of "ordinary language" phi- 
losophers and lawyers to obtain an adequate analysis of the meaning of moral 
and legal words by exhibiting particular sentences of ordinary language "para- 
42. SAMBURSKY, THE PHYSICAL WORLD OF THE GREEKS (1956); SAMBURSKY, PHYSICS 
OF THE STOICS (1959). 
43. LAWSON, THE RATIONAL STRENGTH OF ENGLISH LAW (1951). 
44. FEARNE, CONTINGENT REMAiNDERS (2d ed. 1773). 
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digmatically," as they are wont to say, is doomed to failure. The language of 
unordinary, theoretically introduced constructs is also required. Second, the fore- 
going considerations demonstrate that any theory of law and morals, such as 
Judge Hand's Austinian legal positivism, which rests on the assumption that 
any meaningful word in normative language is radically empirical in character 
and, therefore, a concept by intuition, cannot account for the constructs of 
English law. 
In saying that the ordinary language philosophers, who echo G. E. Moore 
and the later Wittgenstein, are doomed to failure, I do not mean that they are 
not in part correct or important; they are merely not all-important, because 
there is also, in both the natural and the normative sciences, the nonordinary 
language of constructs or concepts by postulation which the earlier Wittgen- 
stein in his Tractatus called "perfect language." However, ordinary language, 
to the extent that it is correct or important, cannot be taken as exhibiting its 
meaning unambiguously in a "paradigmatic" example. This is the case only 
if ordinary language is interpreted in the radically empirical, rather than in 
the naive realistic meaning which it has for most ordinary people. The reason 
why we reject the naive realistic interpretation of ordinary language is that, 
as shown elsewhere,45 it is a self-contradictory, and hence a false, theory of the 
meaning of words. Our positive thesis, therefore, is that an adequate theory 
of the meaning of both nonnormative and normative language requires the 
concepts by postulation of the "perfect language" of the Wittgenstein of the 
Tractatus and "the ordinary language" interpreted completely in the radical 
empirical manner of the later Wittgenstein. In other words, as noted above, 
an adequate theory of morals and law requires the combination of a radically 
empirical (as distinct from a naive realistic law of Status) American legal 
realism with the legal constructs of Kelsen's legal positivism. 
What is the meaning of the words intrinsically "good" or "bad" and in- 
trinsically "just" or "unjust" in this theory? 
The Cognitive Meaning of Is-Ought (Sein-Sollen) Sentences 
It is generally agreed by all informed and competent contemporary philoso- 
phical and legal analysts that, although Moore's intuitive theory is not the cor- 
rect one, the issue has been sharply focused by him and turns around how one 
escapes what he called the naturalistic fallacy. 
This fallacy, let it be recalled, is that if one identifies the meaning of any 
normative word, in the sense of intrinsically, rather than merely instrumental- 
ly, good or just with any empirical fact whatever, the result is a sentence 
which is a trivial tautology and this clearly is not what the sentence means. 
Moore noted also that the commission of the naturalistic fallacy closes ques- 
tions that are clearly meaningfully open questions in anyone's moral experi- 
ence. For example, if "x is good for me" is equivalent to "x is the most 
pleasant thing for me to do," then the following, obviously meaningful ques- 
45. NORTHROP, op. cit. supra note 6, ch. 21. 
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tion of anybody's moral experience, becomes closed and, in this sense, mean- 
ingless: Should I, in the present situation, do what most pleases me and which 
most pleases the majority of people in the community, or should I do some- 
thing else, namely what I can't help feeling I ought to do? This consequence 
of committing the naturalistic fallacy is usually referred to as Moore's "open 
question argument." 
It is to be noted, however, that this conclusion must be qualified or other- 
wise it would be meaningful to ask of the astronomical planets in their courses 
whether their conduct is good or bad. Certainly it is nonsense to say of the 
planets that, instead of moving, as "the facts of the case" show, in an orbit 
which is an ellipse, they ought to move in a pattern which is a rectangle, do- 
ing a "squads right" at each corner. 
This consideration makes the following question also a cognitively mean- 
ingful one: Of what empirical nonnormative facts is it appropriate to affirm 
that what did occur ought not to have occurred? Clearly, it is the facts of 
human conduct. But this answer, though a necessary, is not a sufficient con- 
dition. Otherwise we would hold a person morally and the law would hold 
him legally responsible if his conduct were known by us or the court "beyond 
the possibility of a reasonable doubt" to be entirely the causal effect of a can- 
cer in his brain and hence of a character such that his behavior was in no way 
subject to his voluntary control. Why is this the case? 
Is it not because of the empirical fact that there is also human conduct 
which is in part, at least, the causal effect of prepositionally held beliefs, free- 
ly assented to and for which, therefore, a person is morally and legally respon- 
sible? In other words, it is meaningless and nonsensical to talk about the con- 
duct of planets, stones or doorknobs being good or bad, or of them behaving 
in a way in which they ought not to have done, because their conduct is not 
a causal effect of their freely-assented-to-propositional beliefs concerning what 
a planet, a stone or a doorknob is and what the other first-order facts of their 
natural environment are. In short, a planet is not a freely assenting, proposi- 
tion-entertaining natural object, whereas a human being is.46 This tells us both 
why it is a fallacy to identify the meaning of any normative word either with 
any empirical fact or to what its cognitive meaning refers. 
The naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy because facts merely are, and it is as 
nonsensical to talk about them being good or bad as it is to talk about them 
being true or false, except in the case (and the exception is the heart of the 
matter) of those facts of human conduct which are in part at least the causal 
effect of freely-assented-to beliefs and commitments of the person indulging 
in the conduct. 
What normative words refer to, as the source of their cognitive meaning, 
therefore, is freely-assented-to propositional beliefs. They are meaningfully 
predicated only of those empirical facts of human conduct which are in part 
46. For the neurological and cybernetic reasons why this is the case, see NORTHROP, 
PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND PRACTICAL POLITICS, part I (1960). 
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or whole the causal effects of such beliefs. The class of such facts is what we 
referred to above as "second-order facts." Hence, "second-order facts" are 
empirical facts of human conduct which are in part or whole the causal effect 
of the freely-assented-to propositional beliefs of the person, or people or their 
official legal and political representatives, who indulge in the conduct. 
The question now arises: What is the criterion for determining when it is 
correct in sein-sollen sentences to say that such second-order factual human 
conduct is morally good and legally just or morally bad and legally unjust? 
If our thesis that sein-sollen sentences are cognitive is meaningful, then this 
criterion, as we showed above, must be an empirical one. This means that it 
must refer to nonnormative empirical facts. Otherwise we would both beg the 
question and fall into the self-contradictory notion of faits normatifs. 
The answer to this crucial question becomes evident when one asks the 
further question: What other facts than second-order facts are there? Our 
answer is "first-order facts," where by such nonnormative first-order facts we 
mean all those facts about oneself and the rest of the natural universe which 
are not causal effects of the beliefs of people. Our empirical criterion, there- 
fore, of when it is correct to predicate the sollen words "ought," "good" and 
"legally just" of second-order facts is the following: That second-order factual 
human conduct is personally good and legally just in the sense of what ought 
to be, when this second-order factual conduct is the causal effect of that freely- 
assented-to propositional belief about first-order factual man and nature, which 
is empirically confirmed to be more probably true than alternative theories. 
That second-order factual human conduct is personally bad, legally unjust and 
not what ought to be, to the extent that it is the causal effect of freely-as- 
sented-to propositional beliefs in nonnormative psychology and natural science 
which, when put to an empirical test cognitively, are not confirmed with a 
higher degree of probability than any alternative theory. Of two such theories, 
to say that one is empirically confirmed with a higher degree of probability 
than another is equivalent to saying that the more probable theory entails all 
the empirical facts entailed by the less probable theory and at least one directly 
inspectable empirical fact which should not be present were the less probable 
theory true. 
It remains to indicate (1) the conception of the judicial review of majority- 
approved legislative statutes and (2) the relation between law and morals that 
this theory entails. Since, according to this theory, there is no meaning to any 
normative word, be it moral or legal, except as it refers to second-order factual 
human conduct which is the causal effect in whole or part of the freely-as- 
sented-to beliefs of the individual person being morally and legally judged, it 
follows that any legislative statute which in its substantive content makes it a 
crime for a person to freely entertain and assent to one or another religious 
or secular belief, by making the holding of one of them a crime, is self-con- 
tradictory. In short, given the sein fact without which a normative word is 
meaningless, the principle of religious and civil liberties is analytic and hence 
tautologically true. We conclude, therefore, that Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart and 
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other moral, legal and cultural relativists are in error when they affirm that 
all the rules of any possible morals and law are hypothetical imperatives, re- 
lative to the particular legal system, culture or person in question. At this 
point we agree with Kant when he affirms that there is at least one categorical 
imperative and with Felix Cohen and Lon Fuller (in the latter's exchange 
with Professor Hart)47 in their thesis that it is legally, as well as morally, 
meaningful to say that the substantive content of the sollen sentences of the 
positive law of any legal system is unjust. These sentences are unjust if they 
violate the freedom of assent of the individual to his own propositional be- 
liefs without which any normative word, be it moral or legal, is meaningless. 
But the right to entertain and freely assent to propositional beliefs is not 
the only analytically true categorical imperative. For the expression "proposi- 
tional belief" is as essential to the sein cognitive reference and meaning of any 
moral or legal word as is the expression "freely assented to." This tells us that 
even though the principle of religious and civil liberties is a necessary con- 
dition, it is not a sufficient one for judging any person's or any positive legal 
system's second-order factual conduct and content to be morally good or legal- 
ly just; what is assented to or written into the substantive content of the First 
Constitution is equally important. It tells us, in other words, what Justice 
Holmes with his notion of "clear and present danger" and other liberal demo- 
crats have had to recognize-the sein fact, namely, that even though the prin- 
ciple of religious and civil liberties is a categorical imperative, it is not ab- 
solute. 
The reason, however, is not the a posteriori one given by Holmes, and by 
Kant in his Philosophy of Law when he said that no legal system can allow 
itself to be destroyed, since no a posterior fact can upset a categorical impera- 
tive, as Kant should have remembered from his earlier works. Also, if, as our 
theory entails, no "ought" word is meaningful unless the propositional belief 
to which one freely assents is empirically or analytically verifiable, then any 
positive legal system, the substantive content of whose First Constitution ex- 
presses a propositional belief which can be shown on either analytic or em- 
pirical grounds to be cognitively false, ought to be destroyed by even its own 
people when they find this to be the case. The reason why the principle of 
religious and civil liberties is not absolute is, therefore, that there is another 
analytically true categorical imperative as well-the categorical imperative that 
we ought to assent only to propositional beliefs which can be shown on either 
analytical or empirical grounds by appeal to first-order facts to be true or more 
probably true, in the sense indicated earlier, than any alternative theory. 
Elsewhere,48 reasons have been given for believing that "law of Contract" 
legal systems, to the extent that their language is that of constructs, entail an- 
other analytically true categorical imperative. Moreover, although analytically 
47. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 
(1958) ; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. 
L. REV. 630 (1958). 
48. NORTHROP, op. cit. supra note 6, ch. 22; and op. cit. supra note 15, ch. 19. 
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true rather than a synthetic a priori proposition, it is identical with the cate- 
gorical imperative of Kant, discussed previously, when it is stated without the 
ambiguities of ordinary language. Stated with contemporary analytic logically 
realistic precision, this gives the following criterion of when any person's be- 
havior or any political system's statutes are good and just: 
(1) (p) (x) : x is intrinsically just: = : x is an instance of a syntactically 
constructed logically realistic relation R such that: 
(i) (p) R, 
and (ii) (p) s of R, where x is the behavior of p or the object 
of any moral or legal judgment and s is the substantive 
content of R. 
Expressed in ordinary language, interpreted logically realistically, this analytic 
expression is: 
For any one person p and any one object of moral and legal judgment x, 
to say that x is intrinsically good and just is equivalent to saying that x 
instances a law R which is such that (i) R is universally quantified for all 
persons and (ii) the substantive content of R is also universally quantified 
for all persons. 
Item (ii) is very important. It means that for any constitutional or legislative 
statute to be just, it is not enough, or even necessary, for it to be approved by 
the majority. Instead, justice means that if the statute in its substantive content 
assigns certain rights or obligations to one person p, or one class of people, oc, 
in the legal system, then any one must be substitutable for that person p, or the 
class of people oc, with respect to those rights and duties. Although defined 
completely formally without reference to sensed properties, this logical realistic 
theory of cosmopolitan morals, law and religion is by no means empty. In fact, it 
is the only theory, of which the writer's extensive reading has made him aware, 
that warrants the unanimous decisions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the desegregation cases when, as is the case, there is no 
federal congressional statute making it a crime for any state to have its segre- 
gated cultural customs and their corresponding positive segregative legislative 
educational statutes. 
It can be shown also that all three analytically true categorical moral and 
legal imperatives were affirmed by the Greek and Roman Stoic mathematical 
physicists, lawyers and moral and religious philosophers and that the result- 
ing "movement from Status to Contract," which is the history of the evolu- 
tion of Western law-a movement now, thanks to the American Declaration 
of Independence, embracing the world-is the working out of these three 
categorical imperatives in history. More specifically, it can be shown that (1) 
Jefferson read the Greek and Roman Stoic political, moral and legal classics; 
(2) these Stoic imperatives passed via Bracton into Coke to give rise to what 
Coke called "Fundamental Law" and, because of its technical legal constructs, 
what the British today call "lawyer's law" and regard as superior to the statu- 
tory law which expresses the approvals of the majority in the legislature; (3) 
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the first legal book which the English lawyer Wythe at Williamsburg made 
Jefferson study sentence by sentence, so that he mastered every legal construct 
in its imageless technical, normative legal meaning, was Coke's Commentary 
on Littleton on Tenures. Hence, (4) both directly by his reading of the Stoic 
Roman lawyers and moral philosophers and indirectly by way of Bracton, Little- 
ton and Coke these three analytically true, categorical imperatives passed to Jef- 
ferson to be expressed (a) in their cosmopolitan (p) international legal implica- 
tions in the American Declaration of Independence, which he wrote,49 and (b) 
in their implications for religious and civil liberties in the Bill of Rights inter- 
preted as law upon which he insisted.50 (5) Items (3) and (4) help us also 
to understand what Jefferson meant when, later in his life, he expressed regret 
at the direction which American legal thinking and education were taking be- 
cause lawyers were studying that woolly-worded fellow, Blackstone, instead 
of Coke and Bracton.51 
Not only were the three technical analytic reasons why the Bill of Rights, 
in its non-a prosteriori part, is to be interpreted by the judges as law being 
lost, to be replaced by Blackstone's quite different woolly-worded theory of 
natural law which enable one to read any a posterior content which one 
pleased into the meaning of this expression, but also the skill of the legal 
craftsman as a technical "lawyer's lawyer" construct-maker was being lost, 
never, as we now know, to be fully recovered. Certainly Austinian legal posi- 
tivism with nothing but its concepts by intuition and their radically empirical 
reference to equally fuzzy introspected pleasures and arbitrary preferences did 
not help matters other than to commit the additional error of confusing these 
equally fuzzy a posterior pleasures of the majority in the legislature with an 
a priori categorical imperative. 
Precisely because (1) all these confusions exist in the law that empirically 
is, and because (2) law is not merely our cognitively analytic categorical im- 
perative prescribing what it ought-to-be, but also a "movement" towards this 
ought-to-be, the American legal realists' realization that one must study its 
sein as well its sollen, if one is to know what morals, law and religion are 
about, is correct. For the reader who is interested in obtaining a clue as to 
how the American legal realists' empirical methods, particularly those of the 
sociological and comparative anthropological jurists, are to be applied to the 
legal movement from the sein to the sollen, so that moral, legal, political and 
religious anarchy and atomic annihilation are not the result, the writer's 
Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics may be of some relevance. 
49. NORTHROP, op. cit. supra note 6, ch. 22. 
50. Jefferson wrote to Madison on March 15, 1789, as follows: "In the arguments in 
favor of a declaration of rights .. , one which has great weight with me [is] the legal check 
which it puts into the hands of the judiciary." (Italics added). JEFFERSON, THE LIFE AND 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 462 (Koch & Peden ed. 1944). 
51. Id. at 726. 
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